Transición del hinduismo como religión a movimiento político en la India.
When India gained independence from British colonial rule in 1947 and formally inaugurated its republic in 1950, its foundational architects—most notably Jawaharlal Nehru and B.R. Ambedkar—envisioned a sovereign, secular, and democratic state. Written to guarantee liberty, equality, and fraternity for all citizens regardless of ethnic or religious background, the Indian Constitution became the longest written constitution in the world. This founding vision was inherently pluralistic, designed to anchor a vast subcontinent defined by deep religious, linguistic, and cultural diversity.
However, sustaining an inclusive secular framework across such a complex multinational society has faced persistent challenges. Over recent decades, the secular consensus lost much of its popular appeal, opening political space for the rise of Hindu nationalism and the political dominance of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the redefinition of state identity around majoritarian ideals has fundamentally challenged the constitutional vision of the founding leaders, signaling a profound reconfiguration of Indian democracy.
Understanding Hindu Nationalism
To grasp the nature of this political transformation, one must distinguish between Hinduism as an ancient, diverse faith, and Hindutva, as a modern political ideology. While Hinduism has anchored the subcontinent's cultural fabric for millennia, Hindu nationalism represents the deliberate politicization of religious identity. The ideological framework of Hindutva—or "Hinduness"—was popularized in 1923 by Vinayak Damodar Savarkar in his foundational text, Hindutva: Who is a Hindu?. He conceptualized India not merely as a modern nation-state, but as a civilization whose fundamental essence is intrinsically tied to Hindu culture and values.
Several historical and structural factors propelled Hindutva from an intellectual concept into a potent political movement. First, the anti-colonial struggle encouraged Indian thinkers to reclaim indigenous cultural roots as an antidote to colonial domination. Second, the socio-economic transformations following economic liberalization in the 1990s created fertile ground for reasserting traditional cultural symbols that had been subdued during earlier decades of socialist-oriented policies (Jaffrelot, 2007). Third, the rapid evolution of modern digital communications allowed nationalist narratives to be widely disseminated. Prime Minister Modi’s electoral triumphs rely heavily on sophisticated social media strategies designed to mobilize support. Crucially, while mainstream Hindu philosophy frequently honors ahimsa (non-violence)—as famously practiced by Mahatma Gandhi—political Hindutva has largely abandoned this principle in its pursuit of ideological dominance.
Hindu Nationalism in the Indian Political Sphere
Over the past several decades, Hindu nationalism has steadily expanded its reach, reshaping governance, policy, and social attitudes at the direct expense of India’s secular framework. The organizational backbone of Hindutva is the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), founded in 1925 as a cultural and paramilitary organization dedicated to Hindu unity and strength. By 2019, the RSS claimed over five million affiliated members. Beginning in the 1960s, the RSS created a broad network of specialized cultural and social affiliates known collectively as the Sangh Parivar.
The movement soon moved beyond social mobilization into electoral politics. The RSS initially backed the current Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), and a major turning point occurred during the 1980s-90s with the Ram Janmabhoomi movement, which campaigned to construct a Hindu temple on the site of the Babri Masjid mosque in Ayodhya. The mobilization culminated in December 1992, when Hindu nationalist mobs demolished the 16th-century mosque, triggering widespread communal violence and entrenching religious polarization across the nation (Jaffrelot, 2007).
Although Muslims constitute roughly 14% of India’s population—compared to Hindus at 78.9%—Hindutva ideology casts non-Hindu communities, particularly Muslims and Christians, as civilizational "outsiders" despite their centuries-long presence on the subcontinent. This ideological stance has frequently translated into systemic marginalization and targeted communal violence.
A catastrophic example occurred during the 2002 Gujarat riots. Following a fire on a train carrying Hindu pilgrims in Godhra, retaliatory violence targeted Muslim communities across Gujarat under Chief Minister Modi. Over 1,000 people—mostly Muslims—were killed, alongside widespread arson, mass sexual violence, and displacement. Human rights reports highlighted severe state complicity; voter lists were systematically utilized to identify and target Muslim residences and businesses with clinical precision (Human Rights Watch, 2002). Beyond outbreaks of direct violence, institutional discrimination has been codified through legislative measures. Several BJP-governed states have passed stringent anti-conversion laws that disproportionately target religious minorities.
Modi’s Administrations and Indian Democracy in an Uncertain Future
The BJP’s decisive electoral victory in 2014 ushered in a new political era centered on Modi’s populist leadership. Replacing the older consensus-building style of the Congress party, Modi established a personalistic regime focused on direct mass engagement. By projecting an image as a humble leader of the "common man" standing against a corrupt elite, Modi built immense appeal among the electorate, particularly the emerging middle class.
However, this brand of populism relies heavily on exclusive narratives. Utilizing social media channels for unmediated communication, the administration has frequently deployed divisive language that casts political dissent as national disloyalty. By constructing religious minorities—especially Muslims—as the political "other," the ruling dispensation erodes the constitutional social contract and undermines the pluralistic foundation essential for democratic debate (López Areu, 2018).
As the BJP consolidated power across both federal and state levels, traditional institutional checks and balances faced significant strain. By framing executive policies as the unmediated "will of the people," the administration has routinely bypassed institutional debate and marginalized political opposition (López Areu, 2018). This centralization of power weakens institutional accountability and risks tilting democratic governance toward majoritarian authoritarianism. Nevertheless, the 2024 general election presented a noticeable setback for the BJP, revealing growing democratic resilience. Facing shifting public sentiments, the ruling party now confronts a strategic dilemma: whether to double down on majoritarian polarization or recalibrate toward a broader, more inclusive political approach.
Conclusion
Indian democracy stands at a pivotal crossroads. While majoritarian Hindu nationalism has reshaped the nation's political landscape over the past decade, recent electoral signals indicate that significant portions of the electorate—including middle-class voters—are growing weary of divisive identity politics. There is an emerging demand for political leadership that reaffirms India's rich pluralism and values unity over polarization. If this trend persists, the democratic process may yet reassert itself, restoring a balanced political model that protects minority rights, respects institutional norms, and honors the founding principles of the Indian Republic.
Bibliography
Anderson, E., & Jaffrelot, C. (2018). Hindu nationalism and the ‘saffronisation of the public sphere’: an interview with Christophe Jaffrelot. Contemporary South Asia, 26(4), 468–482.
Human Rights Watch. (2002). We Have No Orders to Save You: State Participation and Complicity in Communal Violence in Gujarat.
Jaffrelot, C. (2007). Hindu nationalism: A reader. Princeton University Press.
López Areu, M. (2018). El populismo hinduista de Narendra Modi: reimaginando la nación india. Revista CIDOB d’Afers Internacionals, 119, 113–134.
